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Panentheism
Promises and Problems
Since the 1990s, many publications have appeared on panentheism – the 
view that “all things exist in God,” even though God is not exhausted by 
the world of nature. Several disciplines have shaped the discussions – from 
philosophical theology to science-and-religion dialogues, and more recently, 
the field of comparative religion. This volume adds to the philosophical 
resources of panentheism, while further exploring its promises and internal 
ramifications.
Even though the term “panentheism” was coined by the German Idealist 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause in 1829 and developed under the inspira-
tion of F. W. J. Schelling’s philosophy of nature (Göcke 2013), no one has 
done more to bring the concept of panentheism into broader prominence 
than Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000). In Philosophers Speak of God from 
1953, he and William L. Reese presented panentheism as a perennial option 
in the history of religion, with precursors from the Egyptian religious ruler 
Akhenaten up to Plato (Hartshorne and Reese 1953, 29–57). They admitted, 
though, that modern representatives such as F. Schelling, A. N. Whitehead, 
and C. S. Peirce expressed the vision of panentheism more clearly. In their 
seminal work, however, one also notices an interest in presenting panenthe-
ism as a view capable of transcending the existing borderlines between the 
major world religions. Among the representatives of modern panentheism, 
Hartshorne and Reese list philosophers and theologians as different as the 
Russian-Orthodox Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948), the Muslim philosopher 
and politician Muhammed Iqbal (1877–1938), the Protestant theologian and 
medical doctor Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965), the Jewish thinker Martin 
Buber (1878–1965), and the Hindu philosopher and statesman Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) (Hartshorne and Reese 1953, 285–310).
One finds a similar, if not even a stronger appeal to the compass of 
panentheism in a recent anthology, Panentheism across the World’s Tradi-
tions (Biernacki and Clayton 2014). In her introduction, Loriliai Biernacki 
argues that the
“new panentheism of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is a vision that 
follows the claims of science toward a universalism. No doubt, this is a religiosity that 
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eschews particular traditional revelations for the sake of a wider, more encompassing 
vision as a response to our contemporary shrinking globe, our world in which the con-
tradictions of too many various, incommensurable revelations demand a response, beg 
for a synthesis” (8–9).
In Biernacki’s view, panentheism promises as “new big vision of the ‘spiritual 
but not religious’” (8). Here, panentheism is not seen as a distinct philosoph-
ical or theological view, but rather as an expression of a global spirituality 
that is able to draw on resources from different religious traditions. Accord-
ingly, the reader is presented to a broad cluster of panentheistic images with 
a variety of family resemblances, thus “affirming complementarities rather 
than forcing final decisions,” as the other editor, Philip Clayton, puts it (201). 
The promises of panentheism seem inextricably bound up with the weight 
of its many expressions.
Indeed, it remains an open question whether the fluidity of panentheism 
constitutes a problem, or is part of its attraction. Sometimes concepts are 
important heuristic tools by pointing in the right direction, without being 
able to settle the issues in a fully satisfying way. This triggers the question, 
to what extent is panentheism a stable concept? Accordingly, there are two 
ways to proceed: One is to celebrate the manifold expressions of panenthe-
istic imagery in the service of multifarious spiritualities, the other way is to 
re-specify core commitments of panentheism within distinctive philosophi-
cal views. In communicating the concerns of panentheism, we may need a 
little of both.
In their day, Hartshorne and Reese chose the path of conceptualization. 
Their view was that even though panentheism takes several forms, it has 
identifying characteristics, too. Panentheism offers a both comprehensive 
and integral theological vision: “God as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, 
Knowing and Including the World in His Own Actuality [but not Essence]” 
(Hartshorne and Reese 1953, xiii). Hence the acronym ETCKW. The point 
is that the inclusion of the world in divine experience certainly affects divine 
life but does not change the essence of God as the creative and responsive 
love of all that exists.
According to Hartshorne and Reese, both classical pantheism and classi-
cal theism are truncated versions of the richer view of panentheism. Classi-
cal pantheism has the following logic: “God as Eternal, Knowing and Includ-
ing the World [So Far as ‘Real’]”. Hence the acronym ECKW (whereby the 
extent of the world-inclusion in God depends on what the pantheist thinker 
regards as real rather than unreal features of the mundane world). Classical 
theism, in this taxonomy, appears as even more truncated insofar as classical 
theism also denies the inclusion of the world in God. Here, God is “Eternal 
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Consciousness, Knowing [but not Including] the World.” Hence the meager 
acronym ECK for classical theism. As spelled out by Hartshorne in his con-
cluding essay to the volume, there is a substantive “logic of panentheism” 
(499–514). In Hartshorne’s view, panentheism does more than offer a medi-
ating view between classical theism (which separates God and world into 
two domains) and pantheism (which identifies God and world). Panenthe-
ism is superior to both rivals simply by being more comprehensive in terms 
of logical compass.
Unfortunately, process philosophers Hartshorne and Reese do not dis-
cuss in detail the differences between their dipolar view of God as both 
eternal and temporal and the view of A. N. Whitehead on whom they oth-
erwise build their concept of panentheism (273–77). According to White-
head, there is no dipolarity within God, but only between God and world 
(Bracken 2014a, 5). In Process and Reality from 1929, creativity is seen as the 
ultimate metaphysical principle, sustaining both divine and worldly events: 
“God and world are the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity 
achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoint multiplicity, with its diver-
sities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast” 
(Whitehead [1929] 1978, 348). God and world are thus two distinct realities 
standing in a continuous interaction with one another, both influencing, or 
even “creating” one another. Seminal to both Hartshorne’s and Whitehead’s 
view is the intuition of a two-way interaction between God and world. God 
is not only creative but also responsive in relation to what emerges in the 
course of evolution and creaturely development.
It is, curiously enough, hard to define panentheism via its own name – 
in terms of “all things being in God.” In fact, the same formula also appears 
already in the work of the arch-representatives of classical theism and pan-
theism. Thomas Aquinas uses the metaphor of in-being when saying that 
“one does use the bodily metaphor and talk of everything being in God inas-
much as God contains them” (S.Th. I, q. 8, a. 1 ad sec. = Thomas 1964–65, 
2:113). Spinoza contends that “everything is in God,” too (Ethica I, prop. 15 
= Spinoza 1967, 2:106). Certainly, Thomas and Spinoza would differ on the 
meaning of this expression. In contrast to panentheism, however, they would 
say that just as the world cannot affect the being and mind of God (S.Th. I, 
q. 28, a. 1 = Thomas 1964–65, 8:22–27), so particular beings cannot change 
the immanent cause of Nature, which strictly determines all concrete modes 
of being (Ethica I, prop. 18 and 25 = Spinoza 1967, 2:120, 124).
There are, however, several fruitful ways of understanding the “in-being” 
of panentheism. The root metaphor is spatial in orientation. But if God is 
infinite, a spatial metaphor is presupposed while at the same time tran-
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scended, since infinity, by definition, cannot be measured. By contrast, the 
spatial metaphor applies well to the finite beings that belong to, and in this 
sense are also included within divine life. “Being in God” means being part 
of a divine community, even to the point of standing in an intimate, internal 
relation with God. Arthur Peacocke captures this point well by stating, “The 
‘in’ metaphor has advantages in this context over the ‘separate but present to’ 
terminology of divine immanence in Western classical theism. For God is 
best conceived of as the circumambient reality enclosing all existing entities, 
structures, and processes, and as operating in and through all, while being 
‘more’ than all” (Peacocke 2004, 146).
The question is, then, how to conceive of the relation between God and 
world. Is it a unilateral relation, or a two-way relation between God and 
world? In my view, the intuition of a living and reciprocal interrelation is the 
best candidate for delineating the contours of panentheism, also beyond the 
particular emphasis of Whiteheadian process philosophy. Indeed, panen-
theism suggests that there are temporal aspects to divine life, without need-
ing to assume that the past lapses away from divine memory as is the case 
in finite human minds. The intuition of the two-way relation between God 
and creatures is exactly what classical theism (à la Thomism) and classical 
pantheism (à la Spinozism) emphatically deny; both subscribe strongly to 
the oneness and sameness of the divine source respectively natura naturans.
If one follows this route of defining panentheism, the history of philoso-
phy and religion will have fewer ancient proponents of panentheism than 
sometimes assumed. In his otherwise impressive study, Panentheism: The 
Other God of the Philosophers, John W. Cooper argues, by contrast, for a very 
long tradition of panentheism in philosophical theology, a tradition going 
back to Plato and Neo-Platonism (Cooper 2007). However, the extensive use 
of the metaphor of a divine light (or, Wisdom) illuminating, penetrating, 
and permeating all created orders does not suggest that there is any enrich-
ment moving backwards, as it were, from world to God. In the Neo-platonic 
model, God is restlessly productive, but never receptive, hence never rela-
tional; even the best reflections of the divine light will only be faint images 
of the primordial Light.
This constitutes an argument for letting the panentheist movement begin 
in the nineteenth century CE rather than in the fifth century BCE, or even 
earlier. Certainly, panentheism may also have a longer prehistory inspired by 
a Christian theology of love – a love originally predicated only about those 
promised to become “sharers of divine nature” (1 Pt 1:4) by divine grace. In 
the Fransiscan tradition, we find a particular strong notion of divine love, 
related to the doctrine of creation, too. Duns Scotus, for example, argues that 
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God’s reason for creating the world was God’s desire to have fellow loving 
beings beyond divine life (Opus Oxoniense III, d. 32, q.1, n. 6 = Duns Scotus 
2007, 136–39; cf. Müller 2014, 25). In the nineteenth century, such distinc-
tively theological views of the salvific purpose of divine love may have been 
extended into a general view of a divine relational love towards the universe 
at large. If so, soteriological visions of “being in God” may have inspired the 
expressivist panentheisms of the nineteenth century as well as the dipolar 
panentheisms of process theology in the twentieth century (Gregersen 2004).
In this vein, process theology has also developed new versions of panen-
theism. In Joseph Bracken’s system-oriented approach, divine life is pre-
sented as the all-inclusive system that comprehends all creaturely systems, 
while preserving and sustaining the self-organizational capacities of more 
limited systems, from atoms and molecules to human societies and eco-
logical systems (Bracken 2014b, 75–89). If God is conceived of as a separate 
entity (as in classical theism), God remains contrasted to creaturely entities. 
This is not the case, however, in interacting hierarchical systems, in which 
the lower-level systems (say, atoms) retain their own causal forces, even 
though they operate in higher-level systems (say, central nervous systems).
As will become evident in this volume, however, there are further 
resources for developing panentheist visions. John R. Shook undertakes an 
ambitious attempt at reconstructing C. S. Peirce’s philosophical theology. As 
Shook points out, Peirce’s personal conviction leaned towards a fairly trans-
cendent God in the vein of classical theism. Yet, Peirce’s attempt at under-
standing God in relation to the three “universes” of potentiality (firstness), 
the brute actuality of things (secondness), and the multiple connections and 
laws between the features of the three universes (thirdness) led him to deal 
with chance and real time aspects of reality, thus bringing him into the vicin-
ity of panentheism. Shook presents four models for reconstructing Peirce’s 
undeveloped philosophical theology, opting for a dynamical panentheism, 
without ruling out the traces of classic theism and pantheism that can also 
be found in Peirce’s philosophy.
The next two articles relate panentheism to Christian concepts of the 
incarnation and Trinity. Adam Pryor brings the generative body phenom-
enology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty into communication with the concept of 
‘deep incarnation.’ The argument is that Merleau-Ponty’s view of the closely 
woven fabric between bodily sensing and what is sensed as bodily, offers 
a perspective for speaking of ‘flesh’ as something which is shared between 
living bodies yet also interlaced in the ongoing interactions between liv-
ing bodies and things in their life-world. As in Peirce, here as well we find 
phenomena that criss-cross the borderlines between human perceivers and 
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things perceived. In the Fundierung of perception, so Pryor argues, what is 
founding and what is founded cannot be separated. Similarly, in the view of 
deep incarnation, God takes shape in the concrete body of Jesus while also 
being connected with the world of inter-corporeality.
Jan-Olav Henriksen also moves into theological territory when interpret-
ing the triune life as a mutual in-dwelling and co-constitution (perichore-
sis) characterized by a love that extends itself to the world of creation. Yet, 
speaking of love, and of divine love, is only possible based on experiences 
fully situated within the world. Against this background, Henriksen argues 
that the early modern concept of “supernaturalism,” presupposed also in the 
Evolutionary Cognitive Theory of Religion, is not a sustainable concept, nei-
ther in terms of philosophy nor in those of Christian theology. Panentheism 
points to the fact that love must be embodied in order to be experienced. 
Moreover, speaking of divine love as a pervasive love requires not only that 
God become human, but also that this divine self-embodiment is ‘deep’ 
in the sense of being internally related to the full scope of creation – from 
atmosphere and water to the precursors of the human species.
The final article by Kenneth A. Reynhout offers a critical analysis of stand-
ard ramifications of the science-religion dialogue. He argues that the impor-
tance of science for theology has been limited due to the attempt of theo-
logians to find a common ground with scientists at the abstract level of 
epistemology, for example, by assuming ‘critical realism’ as a common start-
ing point. Instead, Reynhout points to the Continental hermeneutical tradi-
tion, which continues to be the fundamental paradigm of leading systematic 
theologians. After all, the business of theologians is not to develop scientific 
explanations but rather to interpret scientific theories and findings from 
a theological perspective. Aiming to overcome the explanation vs. under-
standing dichotomy, he points to the work of Paul Ricœur as an attempt to 
understand the world also via explanation. Conversely, also scientific expla-
nations stand in need of interpretation. Reynhout argues that the task of 
theologians is to seek an understanding of faith through explanation, includ-
ing scientific explanations.
These essays intend to provoke further discussion of philosophical 
resources not so often used in the context of science-and-religion discus-
sions. The reviews serve the same purpose.
Niels Henrik Gregersen, Copenhagen
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